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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Something s Happening to People Like Me 
At only twenty-six years of age, sporting long sideburns, slicked back hair, and 
mod striped pants, autoworker Dewey Burton could barely contain his rage 
over the state of politics or his frustration with his job in the spring of 1972. 
Dewey loved nothing more than customizing and racing automobiles, 
transforming old parts into dazzling metallic-flake creations, but he could 
barely tolerate his job at the Wixom Ford plant just outside of Detroit where 
he felt sentenced to a trivial role in assembling them. Satisfied with his pay, 
he was part of a widespread movement across the heartland fighting the 
mind-numbing tedium of industrial production. Reflecting the broad dis-
content on the floors of the nation's factories, some of which grew into open 
revolt, he remarked, "I hate my job, I hate the people I work for . . . . It's kind 
of stupid to work so hard and achieve so little." 
Politically, Burton identified himself as a committed New Deal Demo-
crat, but he was livid over plans to bus his son across Detroit in order to 
conform to the Supreme Court's idea of racial integration—policies driving 
his politics quickly to the right. Like the nation as a whole, Burton was sim-
ply being torn in too many directions at once. He was a figure in transition, 
the type of person journalist Pete Hamill had in mind when he wrote "The 
working-class white man is actually in revolt against taxes, joyless work, the 
double standards and short memories of professional politicians, hypocrisy 
and what he considers the debasement of the American dream."1 
Dewey Burton may not have been the typical disgruntled worker of the 
1970s, but the New York Times believed that he came pretty close. He proved to 
be an able ambassador to the newspaper's professional middle-class readership 
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interested in the increasingly exotic state of disaffected blue-collar America. 
He first surfaced in a New York Times article on industrial discontent at the 
Wixom plant in 1972. Shortly thereafter, a reporter selected him to explain to 
an incredulous readership the reasons for northern workers' support for back-
lash populist and presidential candidate Alabama governor George Wallace, to 
whom Burton had turned because of his opposition to busing. The New York 
Times returned to interview Dewey during the fall 1972 campaign, the 1974 
midterm elections, and the presidential contests in 1976 and 1980. Smart and 
well spoken, Burton had a demeanor that merged proletarian and mod, greaser 
and beatnik into a synthesis of optimistic sixties unrest and claustrophobic 
seventies resignation that would be hard to sustain as the decade unfolded. As 
a result, Burton noted, "I received my fifteen minutes of fame four times."2 
The media attention lavished on workers like Burton was part of a broad 
blue-collar revival in the 1970s, as working-class America returned to the na-
tional consciousness through strikes, popular culture, voting booths, and 
corporate strategy. Making sense of what Newsweek called the "far-ranging, 
fast spreading revolt of the little man against the Establishment" bordered on 
a national obsession. Fortune, along with countless other magazines and tele-
vision news features, recognized the workers of the early seventies as "restless, 
changeable, mobile, demanding" and headed for "a time of epic battle between 
management and labor" given the "angry, aggressive and acquisitive" mood 
in the shops. As many big contracts expired, inflation ate up wage gains, and 
workers challenged the rules of postwar labor relations, the country wit-
nessed the biggest wave of strike activity since 1946 (which was the biggest 
strike year in all of U.S. history). In 1970 alone there were over 2.4 million 
workers engaged in large-scale work stoppages, thirty-four massive stop-
pages often thousand workers or more, and a raft of wildcats, slowdowns, 
and aggressive stands in contract negotiations. Like so many other observers 
of the seventies labor scene, Time magazine connected the seventies' unrest 
to the battered ideals of the Depression decade. "Blue collar workers," the 
newsmagazine reported, "are gaining a renewed sense of identity, of collective 
power and class that used to be called solidarity."3 
Despite the frequent analogies to Depression-era militancy that often 
cropped up in coverage of the nation's "blue collar blues," the workers burst-
ing upon the national stage in the seventies were hardly the stock proletarian 
character of the 1930s popular imagination. They appeared less as social-
realist heroes of the industrial age than in ways that were simultaneously 
profound and strange, militant and absurd, traditional and new, male and 
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female, insurgent and reactionary, as well as white, black, and brown. Whether 
re-christened as the "hardhats," "the unmeltable ethnics," the "forgotten man," 
the "Silent Majority," the "working class majority," the "middle Americans" 
or the "new militants" depended upon at whom the observer looked; whether 
the Dewey Burtons of the world were in the midst of an industrial insur-
gency or political backlash depended upon where the observer stood. The 
acid-dipped lyrics of urban jazz poet Gil Scott-Heron may have captured 
the basic tension best: "America doesn't know whether it wants to be Matt 
Dillon or Bob Dylan." Indeed, as the crosscurrents affecting Burton begin 
to suggest, whether the country wanted to be led, tall in the saddle, to a res-
toration of the ancien regime, cowboy style, by Marshall Matt Dillon of the 
television show Gunsmoke, or whether it wanted to meld the workerism of 
Woody Guthrie with the New Politics of the sixties a la early Bob Dylan 
remained one of the core dilemmas of the decade. "In the 1970s," labor leader 
Gus Tyler declared, "fury comes easily to the white worker. He is ready for 
battle. But he does not quite know against whom to declare war."4 
I 
Political forecasters in the seventies saw working people's hope layered with 
anxiety and their traditions undermined by a confusing phalanx of new prob-
lems. The seventies had the potential, as two labor intellectuals put it, of 
becoming "Labor's Decade—Maybe." Advancing the old class politics of the 
thirties in concert with the new social movements of the sixties could make the 
1970s "not the dawning of the Age of Aquarius," but "a new era for the work-
ingman." Famed left wing intellectual Michael Harrington, trying to make 
sense of the crosscurrents in blue-collar America, said that the nation was mov-
ing "vigorously left, right, and center at the same time."5 
Burton found himself caught in the turbulence. After the tumultuous 
1968 primary campaign and the disaster of the Chicago Democratic Con-
vention, he readily toed the unions' line for their bread-and-butter man, 
Hubert Humphrey. Regarding himself "as a union man coming from a long 
line of F.D.R. Democrats," it seemed the only sensible position for a worker 
to take. "People have been telling me since I was a child that when the 
Democrats were in office, everybody was put to work," Dewey noted. That 
1968 race, however, was the last time Burton would call himself an unwav-
ering Democrat as busing all but shattered his faith in the mainstream of the 
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party. Extending the separate-is-not-equal logic ofBrown v. Board of Educa-
tion (1954), the Supreme Court decided in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education (1971) that integrating school children through manda-
tory busing was an appropriate remedy for racial segregation in the public 
schools. And in Burton's Detroit, plans were to integrate not just the schools 
within the city, but the suburbs with the city. "What burns me to the bottom 
of my bones is that I paid an excessive amount of money so that my son 
could walk three blocks to school," he explained about his family's small 
bungalow on the edge of Detroit. The leafy affluence of the term "suburb," 
however, hardly matched the rows of plain-stoop homes of Dewey's Red-
ford, a township hugging the border of Detroit where many streets, includ-
ing the Burtons', still remained unpaved. "I'm not going to pay big high 
school taxes and pay more for a home so that somebody can ship my son 30 
miles away to get an inferior education," he declared.6 
Burton decided that the answer to the busing threat was to pull the lever 
for the pivotal political figure of the era, George Wallace, for the Democratic 
nomination for president in 1972. The governor of Alabama, who famously 
stood in the schoolhouse doorway to defend segregation and who swore never 
to be "out niggered" in politics, was busy rattling the stale presumptions of 
both major parties. As an independent candidate in 1968, Wallace drew to-
gether the segregationist South with anti-liberal northerners concerned about 
blacks moving into their neighborhoods, fearful of the riots, and feeling sim-
ply forgotten. His candidacy enabled the political transformation of a sub-
stantial slice of white working people to become dislodged from the Roosevelt 
coalition and move toward what Kevin Phillips famously called The Emerging 
Republican Majority (1969). By the time George Wallace returned as an in-
surgent candidate in the fragmented Democratic primaries in 1972, his per-
formance was roughly equal to any major candidate. He earned Dewey 
Burton's vote en route to a victory in the Michigan primary on the day after 
he was crippled by the bullet of a would-be assassin in suburban Baltimore.7 
Separating George Wallace's race baiting from his "stand up for the com-
mon man" theme is as difficult as untangling race from class in U.S. history, 
but his blue-collar rhetoric spoke to themes that no one else on the national 
stage addressed. Among northern wage earners like Burton, Wallace's pop-
ulist anti-elitism, anti-crime, and anti-busing messages worked best, but his 
overt embrace of segregation, his snarling rhetoric, and petty resentments 
failed. In a typical stump speech, Wallace effectively stirred the pot of popu-
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list anti-elitism that had been simmering in American politics since Andrew 
Jackson: 
Now what are the real issues that exist today in these United States? It is the 
trend of pseudointellectual government where a select elite group have written 
guidelines in bureaus and court decisions, have spoken from some pulpits, some 
college campuses, some newspaper offices, looking down their noses at the aver-
age man on the street, the glass workers, the steel workers, the auto workers, 
and the textile workers, the farm workers, the policemen, the beautician, and 
the barber, and the little businessman, saying to him that you do not know how 
to get up in the morning or go to bed at night unless we write you a guideline. 
At the heart of the Wallace phenomenon was ambiguity about his cause. As 
one trucker explained, "I'm for either him or the Communists, I don't care, 
just anybody who wouldn't be afraid of the big companies." While conserva-
tive strategists were originally skeptical of Wallace's "country and western 
Marxism," they quickly found it the key to their own populist appeal in the 
1970s—a key that would eventually open the door to the white working 
class vote for Ronald Reagan.8 
The DayGlo® "This Family W I L L N O T Be Bused" sticker on the Bur-
tons' screen door was a complicated thing. Many anxious old liberals and 
impatient New Leftists dismissed votes like Dewey's as clear racism, but his 
political choices cannot be dismissed so simply. Raised poor (the first indoor 
running water he had was when he moved from southern Illinois to Detroit 
as a teenager), Dewey nonetheless profited from generations of segregated 
housing patterns, silent white privilege, and occupational segregation. Still, 
he felt open to black people as both leaders and neighbors. He touted his 
black union local leader as "the best president we've ever had" and claimed 
that he would welcome anyone into his neighborhood. "If a black mom and 
daddy buy or rent a house here and send their kids to [my son] David's school 
and pay their taxes, that's fine. Busing black kids to white neighborhoods and 
white kids to black neighborhoods is never going to achieve integration. It's 
upsetting. It's baloney." Like Wallace, Burton also detested "welfare free-
loaders," pointing to an unruly white family that lived down the block. His 
protest against liberalism had as much to do with control of his life, the fate 
of his family, and his modest and tenuous place on the social ladder as it did 
anything else.9 
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For working people, the social upheavals associated with the sixties actu-
ally took root in most communities in the seventies, which was not simply a 
different decade but a distinctly less generous economic climate. From a policy 
perspective, the Democratic Party faced a dilemma that it could not solve: 
finding ways to maintain support within the white blue-collar base that came 
of age during the New Deal and World War II era, while at the same time 
servicing the pressing demands for racial and gender equity arising from 
the sixties. Both had to be achieved in the midst of two massive oil shocks, 
record inflation and unemployment, and a business community retooling to 
assert greater control over the political process. Placing affirmative action onto 
a world of declining occupational opportunity risked a zero-sum game: a 
post-scarcity politics without post-scarcity conditions. Despite the many forms 
of solidarity evident in the discontent in the factories, mines, and mills, with-
out a shared economic vision to hold things together, issues like busing forced 
black and white residents to square off in what columnist Jimmy Breslin 
called "a Battle Royal" between "two groups of people who are poor and 
doomed and who have been thrown in the ring with each other."10 
The mercurial nature of the politics of '72 was such that when Wallace 
was eliminated from the race, Dewey voted for the most left-leaning candi-
date of any major party in the twentieth century, Democratic senator George 
McGovern. The choice did not come easily. The autoworker was genuinely 
stumped about whether incumbent Richard Nixon's Silent Majority or chal-
lenger George McGovern's soggy populism best represented his interests. It 
would be a betrayal of everything he stood for to vote for a Republican, he 
believed, but he had grave concerns about McGovern and his entourage of 
student radicals. He also sensed a "meanness" creeping into McGovern's 
campaign after he threw vice presidential nominee Tom Eagleton off the 
ticket due to his earlier problems with mental illness. Much of the labor 
movement, especially the hierarchy of the American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), could not stomach Mc-
Govern's New Politics with its anti-war positions, youth movements, and 
commitment to open up the Democratic Party to wider spectrum of Ameri-
cans. The labor federation, fearing for its traditional kingmaker role in the 
Democratic Party, fought the McGovern insurgency with every scrap of in-
stitutional power it could muster.11 
Meantime, Richard Nixon, taking his cues from Wallace, was designing 
his own heretical strategy to woo white working-class voters away from the 
party of Roosevelt. His plans to build a post-New Deal coalition—the "New 
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Majority" he liked to call it—around the Republican Party in 1972 was 
based on making an explicit pitch for white, male, working-class votes by ap-
pealing to their cultural values over their material needs. His targets were 
men like Burton, who had first been dislodged from the Democratic main-
stream by George Wallace. Despite Nixon's courtship of Dewey's vote, the 
autoworker remained suspicious of Nixon's loyalties. "Nixon hasn't proved 
anything to me when he raises the prices of new cars and freezes the wages of 
the people who build them," Burton explained about falling back on bread-
and-butter Democratic politics with his vote for the left-leaning McGovern. 
"I really don't think McGovern will win," he finally concluded. "But maybe 
if we vote for him we can show Nixon what we want, what the working man 
wants." The majority of white working-class voters disagreed, selecting Nixon 
by wide margins over the most pro-labor candidate ever produced by the 
American two-party system.12 
The early seventies' political confusion had its analogue in the discontent 
boiling up on the shop floors. Employees at the Wixom Ford plant where 
Burton worked were a minor part of a national epidemic of industrial unrest 
in the first half of the 1970s. They fought with supervisors on the line, clogged 
up the system with grievances, demanded changes in the quality of work life, 
walked out in wildcat strikes, and organized to overthrow stale bureaucratic 
union leadership. Yet it was a conflicted set of movements. As Dewey ex-
plained, workers were harnessed to union pay but longed to run free of the 
deadening nature of the work itself—and sometimes free of the union lead-
ers who spoke on their behalf. "Once you're there, there's no other way to 
make as much money and get the benefits. Ford's our security blanket. I'm a 
scaredy-cat. If I leave, I lose eight years seniority," he lamented. Chained to 
his paycheck, he dreaded his future at the plant. "Each year I felt like I ac-
complished something. Suddenly I realized that I'm at a dead end and I'll 
probably be hacking on the line for 30 years." Burton's "mouthing off" at the 
; plant had resulted in a string of disciplinary notices for relatively minor 
* infractions, which blocked his hopes of improving his skills and position at 
iFord. Too "pushy" and outspoken, according to his foreman, Burton was trapped at the bottom of the industrial order. As one of his co-workers lamented, Ihere's only three ways out of here. You either conform and become deader each day, or you rebel, or you quit."13 *• Commentators often referred to the unruliness on the assembly lines as the Lordstown syndrome," after the infamous three-week-long strike in J-V72 by a group of young, hip, and inter-racial autoworkers at a General 
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Motors (GM) plant in Lordstown, Ohio, who battled the fastest—and most 
psychically deadening—assembly line in the world, "With all the shoulder-
length hair, beards, Afros and mod clothing along the line," explained News-
week of the notorious GM plant, "it looks for all the world like an industrial 
Woodstock"—suggesting the possibility of an upheaval in class relations for 
the seventies equal to those of race and culture of the 1960s. "At the heart of 
the new mood," declared the New York Times, "there is a challenge to man-
agement's authority to run its plants, an issue that has resulted in some of the 
hardest fought battles between industry and labor in the past." There were 
also new leaders to match the new temperament. Ed Sadlowski, for in-
stance, a rank-and-file leader emerging from the ashen haze of South Chi-
cago's steel works, preached what the Village Voice called "a populist message 
of class conflict and class consciousness that hasn't been heard in this coun-
try since the '30s." As he liked to put it, "There's a fire in the steelworkers' 
union, and I'm not gonna piss on it." When New York television talk show 
host David Susskind asked Dewey Burton and a panel of other discontented 
workers, "Who had the power to change the situation?"—management or the 
union—all four guests chimed in unison, "the rank and file."14 
The old guard mostly found such militancy naive, talk of the "rank and file" 
bordering on the mystic, and the challengers ungrateful for collective bar-
gaining riches that the previous generation had already won for them. As the 
Steel Workers president I .W Abel explained, "Young workers don't appreci-
ate what the union has built. They didn't go through the rough times." Re-
jecting the continuous analogies between the seventies and the thirties, union 
leaders also feared the insurgents' alliances with "outsiders"—especially med-
dlesome liberals and young activists turning from the campuses of the sixties 
to the union halls of the seventies. Both the mainstream labor leadership 
and management seemed to understand—and endorse—historian David 
Brody's fundamental insight about postwar labor relations machinery, a sys-
tem in which all issues were to be funneled strictly through statesman-like 
negotiations. "The contractual logic itself," Brody argued, "actually evolved 
into a pervasive method for containing shop-floor activism." That activism 
was exactly what insurgents hoped would make the seventies into a new era 
of working-class mobilization by bringing unions into the New Politics, de-
livering remedies to the new shop floor demands, and organizing more inclu-
sive and dynamic unions. In contrast, the union bureaucracy saw the upheavals 
as threatening to its power and as crippling labor's ability to deliver the goods. 
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Yet the insurgencies of the early seventies, resisted so mightily by the union 
hierarchy, were the main source of whatever hope there may have been for up-
dating the old order. The postwar collective bargaining machinery had deliv-
ered the goods, and nobody wanted to get rid of it. "People wanted to kick the 
machine. But they didn't want the machine to stop."15 
Working class discontent was puzzling to a generation accustomed to as-
suming that "the labor question" had long been answered. The problems of 
workers and class may have once existed in the United States, went the domi-
nant logic, but it was solved back in the thirties by union recognition and the 
enlightened New Deal state. The "liberal consensus," the reigning ideology 
of the postwar era produced by that bargain, was in fact premised on the as-
sumption that the set of problems that haunted capitalism for one hundred 
years had been resolved in the technocratic settlement that recognized work-
ers' representatives as junior partners in the success story. In a trenchant cri-
tique of the "ideology of the liberal consensus," however, Godfrey Hodgson 
exposed how class conflict may have been "contained" in postwar America, 
but "the abolition of the working class, in fact, was a myth." By the seventies, 
as workers grew restless with their containment, it became clear that the im-
mense institutional achievements of the previous generation—from labor 
legislation to the building of big unions to the strength of the Democratic 
Party—were both sources of power as well as systems of constraint on the 
future fortunes of the American working class.16 
The complexity of Dewey Burton's life cuts against the simplistic "hard 
hat" stereotype that dominated the decade and that was brought to life each 
week in the most popular sitcom of the decade, All in the Family. Dewey 
found little opportunity for leisure or entertainment, other than his passion for 
customizing cars, but, like the rest of the country, he never missed the 
break-through CBS show he and his wife, Ilona, affectionately referred to by 
the name of its iconic main character, "Archie." All in the Family served as a 
sort of national therapy session as the generations, the races, the genders, and 
the classes clashed over post-sixties values and politics in some of the finest, 
most controversial, and popular television ever created. His wife, Ilona, feared 
that the New York Times reporter saw her as too much of an "Edith"— 
inadequately liberated and at the mercy of the needs of her family even though 
she, too, clocked in for a full shift installing trim for GM. Despite Archie 
becoming the national symbol for the bigoted blue-collar worker, however, 
J-tewey Burton saw nothing of himself in the main character. "He's a fool," 
10 INTRODUCTION 
Dewey reported about Archie. "He's taken hate and bigotry and turned them 
into the most funny things I know. It's like Mark Twain's satire—it's 
hilarious."17 
All in the Family may have been the most important representation of white 
working-class men in popular culture during the early seventies, but it was 
hardly the only one. A multifaceted resurrection of blue-collar America 
appeared in commercial culture from Nashville to Hollywood, echoing the 
issues in the factories and the voting booths. In addition to America's weekly 
encounter with Archie, the top shows in the mid-1970s included Tide Waltons 
(return of the Great Depression); Welcome Back Kotter; Good Times, and San-
ford and Son (life and poverty in the inner city); Tloe Jeffersons (black upward 
mobility); Laverne and Shirley (working girls in the classless fifties), and One 
Day at a Time and Alice (working single mothers take on the world). The new 
shows' emphases on class-infused social problems were a far cry from their 
staid but popular predecessors like Marcus Welby and Gunsmoke. 
Exaggerated pathologies of violent, angry white men received the bulk of 
the attention in popular culture during the first half of the decade, but the 
overall message was more akin to what The Temptations called the "Ball of 
Confusion" in the nation as a whole. The ideological breakdown was evi-
dent all around. Reporters descended on factories for special programs to 
explain the "blue collar blues," and filmmakers turned their lenses toward 
working-class themes across the spectrum—from Peter Boyle's portrayal of 
the neo-fascist Joe to Al Pacino's brilliant identity meltdown in Dog Day 
Afternoon to Jack Nicholson's use of the blue-collar world as a playground of 
authenticity in Five Easy Pieces. Similarly, the themes of country music, a 
genre that once expressed the simple longings of lost souls and broken 
hearts, became embattled terrain in the class wars of the 1970s. By mid de-
cade, however, any faith in the future of the common man was becoming 
difficult to hold. Robert DeNiro's portrayal of the pathologically alienated 
Travis Bickle in Taxi Driver—based on the Warholian diary of the man 
who shot George Wallace solely for the fame it would deliver—provided 
the nation with a new and threatening vigilante anti-hero living outside the 
boundaries of civil society. Just as in the nation's politics and workplaces, 
there was a tug of war in popular culture over the meaning and political 
potential of the working class, a struggle not fully reconciled until the sec-
ond half of the decade. 
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II 
The hope and possibility marbled throughout the confusion of the early part of 
the decade began to fade into the despair of the new order emerging in the 
second half. "I wanted to be somebody," Dewey Burton declared in 1974. "It 
wasn't the money so much as that I just want to have some kind of recognition, 
you know, to be more tomorrow than I was yesterday, and that's what I was 
working for." In addition to plugging away down at the Ford plant, Burton 
had been trying to start his own custom auto painting business, chipping away 
slowly at a college degree, and even playing guitar. "He drove himself," Ilona 
explained. "He'd work all day and study all night and then take his books 
with him to work and read on his breaks." Looking a lot more "sixties" by the 
mid-1970s, with his long hair and black turtleneck, he decided to surrender 
his hopes for the future in order to "concentrate on today," as he put it. "It 
takes so much to just make it that there's no time for dreams and no energy 
for making them come true—and I'm not so sure anymore that it's ever go-
ing to get better," he explained with a poetic fatalism. His creeping despair 
resonated with what Peter Marin identified in Harpers Magazine in 1975 as a 
"new world view emerging among us," focusing on the self with "individual 
survival as its sole good." Burton framed the problem more succinctly. "I real-
ized I was killing myself, and there wasn't going to be any reward for my 
suicide."18 
When Dewey made those remarks in late 1974, he stood not simply at the 
middle of a decade but at a watershed between eras. The 1970s might ap-
propriately be thought of as half post-1960s and half pre-1980s, but they 
were also more than that—they served as a bridge between epochs. A broad 
spectrum of observers, from conservative ("the decade that brought you 
modern life—for better or worse") to liberal ("the great shift in American 
culture, society, and politics") to postmodern ("the undecade that was per-
haps the most important decade"), have formed a consensus that within the 
gloomy seventies we can find the roots of our own time. The period has 
been named "pivotal" not because of its monumental events, its great lead-
ers, or its movements, but because society, from its economic foundations to 
its cultural manifestations, really did move in a new direction. It stands as a 
bookend to the New Deal era: that which was built in the thirties and 
rties politically, economically, and culturally—was beginning to crum-
e barely two generations later. More than a time of mere fads for which it 
mercilessly teased, it was a time of fundamental realignments.19 
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Part of Burton's "no time for dreams" sensibility was reconciling himself 
to his future on the line, but another part was more than personal—it was a 
national disposition. Historian Andreas Killen portrays 1973 as the year of 
the collective "nervous breakdown," a year full of dire news but also "alive with 
a sense of new possibilities and openings to the future, harbingers of an emerg-
ing new postmodern cultural configuration." It was "a deeply schizophrenic 
moment," he found, in which "reality itself seemed to be up for grabs." That 
year was the buildup to a troika of disasters that rattled the American psyche— 
the oil embargo that threatened the nation's supply of energy, the beginning of 
the stagflation that sapped the nation's economic strength, the president's 1974 
resignation that drained its faith—and then the fall of Saigon in 1975 shat-
tered the remains of national purpose. Writing in 1974, Michael Harrington 
noted "a collective sadness" that had descended upon the nation as if it were 
in mourning for a dying era—the promise of modernity itself slipping out of 
reach.20 
Above all, the mid-1970s marked the end of the postwar boom. The years 
prior to the 1973-74 crisis had been the most economically egalitarian time in 
U.S. history, the point on the graph where the bounty was shared most eq-
uitably, and unemployment was at historic lows. The year 1972 was also the 
apex of earnings for male workers. Starting in the 1973-74 years, real earn-
ings began to stagnate and then slide as workers began their slow and pain-
ful dismissal from their troubled partnership with postwar liberalism. By 
mid-decade the record-breaking strikes, rank-and-file movements, and vi-
brant organizing drives that had once promised a new day for workers were 
reduced to a trickle in the new economic climate. They were then replaced 
by layoffs, plant closures, and union decertification drives. White male work-
ers' incomes had risen an astonishing 42 percent since 1960, but those in-
comes stagnated or fell for the next quarter century following the early 
seventies. Real earnings first stagnated and then were driven down by oil 
shocks and inflation; deindustrialization, plant closings, and anti-unionism; 
and a global restructuring of work itself that would continue over the ensu-
ing decades. Most telling of the lost opportunities was that even the rela-
tive rise of women's wages since the 1970s was greatly attributable to the 
decline in male earnings.21 
Burton too saw little hope or opportunity in the new emerging reality at 
mid-decade. Peering out from underneath what he called his "despondency," 
he framed the problem as effectively as any of the sociologists of the time. 
"Something's happening to people like me—working stiffs, as they say—and 
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it isn't just that we have to pay more for this or that or that we're having to do 
without this or make do with a little less of that. It's deep, and hard to ex-
plain, but it's more like more and more of us are sort of leaving all our hopes 
outside in the rain and coming into the house and just locking the door—you 
know, just turning the key and click,' that's it for what we always thought we 
could be."22 
Dewey Burton managed to make it to the polls for the 1974 midterm elec-
tions, but his heart was not in it. The nation delivered the famously liberal 
sweep to Congress in the wake of the Republican humiliation of Watergate, 
but the class of'74 consisted of a new breed of post-1960s, free-market, social 
liberals, who were skeptical of workers' needs and suspicious of their institu-
tions. The new politicians, inspired to do something about urgent issues of 
race and gender inequality, also tended to be chary of structural solutions in 
an era of inflation. For Dewey, however, the problem centered less upon his 
political choices than the lack of meaning in the entire political process. His 
sentiments were echoed in sociologist Robert Nisbet's 1975 book %e Twi-
light of Authority, which charted the decline of the political community in 
the deepest sense of the term. "All we see are enlarging aggregates of atom-
like individuals whose disenchantment with politics and party has become 
translated into indifference, always a dangerous circumstance in a democ-
racy," he argued in refrains of Tocqueville. Predicting a new militaristic Le-
viathan emerging from the toxic political seas, he lamented not the direction 
of the nation but the lack of one, not the politicization of culture but its vacu-
ity. Dewey would have agreed. "You can't blame it all on the politicians," Bur-
ton argued in earthier terms. "But I wish just for once that one of them would say, 
now folks, I swear to God, if you'll elect me, I wont do a damn thing.' That's 
the fellow I'd vote for. Somebody who'd just let us alone."23 
Ill 
In 1976, Dewey Burton announced that he found someone whom he be-
lieved could deliver the nation out of its malaise: former actor, California 
governor, and long-shot presidential candidate Ronald Reagan. He explained 
that he was going to be a "primary jumper"—a Democrat voting in the Re-
publican primary in order to support the California governor's bid to unseat 
President Gerald Ford from the right. In Reagan, Burton found the same 
freshness, independence, backbone, and scrappy spirit that Wallace had shown 
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in 1972 but "without the shadow of racism behind him" that bothered Dewey 
about the Alabama governor. "Four years ago, it was all fire and brimstone— 
busing and the Vietnam War. And then it was Watergate," he recalled about 
the earlier contests. "Now there aren't any issues, except maybe the economy," 
he explained about both the rapid changes in the nation and the hollowing 
out of the political process by 1976.24 
The workers down at the plant regarded Dewey as a "rebel" and a "radical" 
for backing what he saw as Reagan's boldness rather than staying within the 
Democratic Party. Dewey no longer had busing to worry about since the 
Supreme Court's decision in Milliken v. Bradley (1974) exempted the subur-
ban districts outside of Detroit from any part in desegregating inner-city 
school systems, a decision that left a suffocating ring of white flight around 
impoverished major cities in America. Yet he continued to feel a powerful 
draw to the right. "Sure, I've got qualms deep down inside me about voting 
for a Republican," he explained. "But a man's got to grow up sometime," he 
remarked half-consciously brushing aside not just his own youth but the ide-
alism of an earlier time. Reagan lost to incumbent Gerald Ford in the Repub-
lican primary that year, leaving Burton with what he found to be a rather 
unremarkable contest between Ford and Georgia governor Jimmy Carter. It 
had not been just any Republican that fired Dewey's imagination or drew his 
loyalty, as he showed almost no interest in Ford. The election was so dull to 
Burton that by 1980 he had forgotten for whom he voted back in the '76 
national contest. "Silly, we voted for Ford," Ilona reminded him.25 
Trie president of Burton's union, in contrast, held out grand—perhaps 
grandiose—hopes for Jimmy Carter, whom he believed to be a new hybrid 
liberal for a complicated political age. When the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) president endorsed Carter, he hoped he would be the guy who 
could tame the Wallace supporters, entice the black voters, and still offer up 
something for the industrial workers, all while using his Georgian charms 
to turn the South back around to the Democratic column. When Carter 
gained the executive branch after the Democrats had suffered a painful 
eight-year absence from power, many thought a resurrection in labor liber-
alism was in the making. Plans were hatched in the labor, civil rights, and 
liberal groups to revive the old New Deal formula through full employment 
legislation, labor law reform, national health insurance, and industrial pol-
icy. A new, shared economic foundation for politics, they hoped, might miti-
gate the divisiveness then tearing at the party. It was, however, a New Deal 
revival that never happened. Missing from the seventies' progressive agenda 
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were policy innovations that could effectively draw together the economic 
politics of the thirties and the social politics of the sixties, mobilization strate-
gies that might work with a post-Vietnam/post-Watergate electorate skep-
tical of the efficacy of the state, and policies that would not exacerbate the 
nation's main economic problem, stagflation. By late 1978, Carter had al-
ready lurched right in his efforts to beat back inflation and pinned the na-
tion's problems not on material issues but on what he called a "crisis of the 
spirit."26 
By the turning point election of 1980, Dewey Burton's earlier rebellious-
ness had melted into a defensive gratitude for the limited job security he 
possessed. Back in 1972, a unionized manufacturing job seemed like an ex-
istential dead end, but, in the twilight of the industrial golden age, that same 
job had become a rare and coveted source of security. The dwindling num-
bers of workers who had claim on those high-paying industrial jobs found 
themselves to be labor's new aristocracy—shrinking in numbers, paid be-
yond the imagination of the vast unorganized majority, and politically de-
tached from those toiling in the swelling ranks of the non-unionized service 
sector. Dewey was certainly doing quite well. He had earned a slot painting 
parts and then, finally, a much-sought-after position in the skilled trades. 
His promotions, ironically, were partially management's reaction to his me-
dia fame. While he continued to pour his soul into building his T-bucket 
hot rods, Burton's advancements allowed him to move his family up and out 
toward the more comfortable suburbs further outside of Detroit. He had 
come to reflect AFL-CIO president George Meany's boast that modern 
union members have "a great deal more to lose" than in the past. With little 
concern for the unorganized or labor's dwindling power, Meany complacently 
explained, "The more of the world's goods a person has, the more conserva-
tive he becomes."27 
Dewey Burton may have been a good deal more comfortable than he had 
ever been, but, as he might have told a complacent George Meany, he was 
also the last of a dying breed. "It's the first time in 16 years that I've ever 
been threatened with losing my job," he reported in 1980. Like much of the 
economy as a whole, the auto industry was in a tailspin as Chrysler turned to 
a federal bailout and Ford and GM slashed employment levels. "A lot of my 
friends lost their jobs. They won't never come back to the plant," he lamented 
about a layoff of 3,200 workers at the Wixom Ford plant—a pattern that 
rippled across the heartland. Organized labor lost not just the percentage of 
workers they represented in the economy, but, by the end of the decade, the 
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problem had crossed into the loss of real numbers as well (and even then, 
dramatic growth in the public sector masked dramatic losses in the private 
sector). The complacency evident in labor's failure to organize new workers 
or to help create a more expansive working-class identity beyond the indus-
trial core of the AFL-CIO became evident as organized labor's strength 
began to dissolve. Without a strong counter-presence in the growing and 
diverse service and clerical industries—as well as political reforms, new 
labor leadership, and new voices necessary to organize new sectors—the 
unions' ability to withstand the attacks from politicians and business leaders 
weakened along with their industrial base. 
By 1980 Burton completed the most significant transformation in postwar 
political history: from New Deal faithful to icon of discontent to Reagan 
Democrat. In his mind, there was little choice for the 1980 general election. 
"Carter's had four years. He didn't stabilize the country. Don't give me no 
more promises. Let me try somebody else's promises for a change," he con-
cluded in his last interview. "If Carter's so good for the working people, how 
come they're not working?" he demanded about the president's disastrously 
ineffective first and only term. Organized labor rallied to defeat Reagan, but 
Burton believed that the unions' political influence on him and the rest of 
the rank and file had greatly diminished over the course of the decade. He 
also knew that even the UAW's support for Carter was little more than 
"lukewarm"—if for no other reason than the union had supported Ted Ken-
nedy's attempt to unseat Carter from the left in the 1980 primary. On the eve 
of the 1980 election, the New York Times concluded its decade-long look at one 
autoworker, noting, "Dewey Burton has become a happy man, and he will 
gladly vote for Ronald Reagan for president on November 4 . . . [even though] 
he is a strong union man, a Democrat by upbringing and conviction."28 
Burton's choice for the presidency in 1980 helped usher in a new and com-
plex era of working-class political history. The new, more populist right 
proved effective in offering cultural refuge for blue-collar whites, while also 
being the central protagonist in the new economic transformations devastat-
ing working-class communities across the heartland. At a time when the 
traditional working-class ally, the Democratic Party, offered precious little 
material comfort to working people, Ronald Reagan's New Right offered a 
restoration of the glory days by bolstering morale on the basis of patriotism, 
God, race, patriarchy, and nostalgia for community. The Reagan adminis-
tration did squeeze inflation out of the economy but only by allowing his-
toric levels of unemployment, industrial decline, and the decimation of the 
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collective bargaining system—all of which combined to fight inflation by 
lowering wages and raising unemployment. After the president's attack on 
organized labor, most dramatically in the firing of over ten thousand strik-
ing members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, and 
the restructuring of the tax schedule in favor of the wealthy, he looked a lot 
less like the working man's champion. In many parts of the industrial belt, 
the Depression-era analogy became true not in terms of working-class in-
surgencies as it had in the early seventies but, by the early eighties, in terms 
of material reality. As Dewey later confessed, "Reagan blindsided us."29 
As in the political world, the range of working-class possibilities in 
popular culture was similarly diminished by the second half of the 1970s. 
Working-class story lines hardened into three options: escape ones class 
position; find ways to forget it; or, lacking any civic outlets, bury its pains 
deep inside. Tony Manero, the lead in the immensely popular and decade-
defining film Saturday Night Fever, declared his loser buddies in Brooklyn to 
be all "assholes back there" before escaping to upwardly mobile Manhattan. 
His pals were left behind in a simmering racial and ethnic stew with neither 
a future nor any narrative sense of what might happen to them. The future 
belonged to the chosen ones who could get out. Not surprisingly, the urban 
professionals—the "yuppies"—would become for the eighties what workers 
had been for the media in the seventies. By 1980 the ruthless oil baron J.R. 
Ewing of the immensely popular television show Dallas eclipsed Dewey's 
beloved working-class Archie as the media's new totem for the new decade. 
To absorb the narratives of popular culture of the late seventies was to 
relegate the working class to faraway times and places—including the most 
distant, the isolated hearts of working people themselves. The runaway 
popularity of Johnny Paycheck's country novelty song, "Take This Job and 
Shove It" captured the new powerlessness. The blue-collar anthem saturated 
the radio stations, workplaces, and bars of the nation during the second half 
of the decade. Despite the title, the song is less about open rebellion than it 
is about a "hidden transcript" of resistance that takes place internally, far 
from the outward contest of power relations that defined the first half of the 
seventies. The narrator is unable to act; his rebellion is only a fantasy: "I'd 
give the shirt right off of my back / If I had the nerve to say / Take this job 
and shove it!" The surface militancy of the song was actually more about 
what two sociologists dubbed the smoldering "inner class warfare" of the 
seventies, in which "struggle between men leads to struggle within each man." 
•Bruce Springsteen followed up his Whitmanesque paeans of mid-decade 
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escape with ballads of rustbelt workers who failed to make it out, left to 
struggle alone "in the darkness on the edge of town." Music, television, and 
film turned from the hopeful crosscurrents of the early years toward a rather 
unified message: save yourself or face irrelevance.30 
IV 
What many pegged as the promise of a working-class revival in the early 
1970s turned out to be more of a swan song by decade's end. The fragmented 
nature of the labor protests—by organization, industry, race, geography, and 
gender—failed to coalesce into a lasting national presence. The mainstream 
labor movement failed in its major political initiatives. Market orthodoxy 
eclipsed all alternatives, and promising organizing drives ended in failure. 
Deindustrialization decimated the power of the old industrial heartland. The 
vague class alliances of the major parties began to lose their distinction. As 
hip-hop writer Nelson George put it, "The first story is full of optimism and 
exalted ideas about humanity's ability to change through political action and 
moral argument. The next story, the plot we're living right now, is defined by 
cynicism, sarcasm, and self-involvement raised to art. The turning point was 
the early seventies." By 1981, Time magazine predicted little more than "Gloom 
and Doom for Workers."31 
The 1970s, mocked as an era of questionable fashion and bad politics, si-
multaneously appear both irrelevant and the foundation of our own time. 
Yet the history of class in America reveals the profundity in the nothingness 
of the decade, a wholesale transformation without a narrative. One of the 
great constructs of the modern age, the unified notion of a "working class," 
crumbled, and the new world order was built on the rubble. Issues from 
stagflation to racial backlash, Vietnam to deindustrialization, have been fin-
gered as the culprit for the decline of the impulse that animated the chaotic 
great strikes of the Gilded Age, fueled the concerns of the middle-class re-
form impulse of the Progressive Era, finally built the New Deal, and then 
voted in the Great Society. Yet the seventies suggest the fragility at the heart 
of the self-definition of "the working class." It was a conceptual unity that 
could briefly but imperfectly be identifiable as a unionized voting block from 
the New Deal to the 1970s. It ultimately died of the many external assaults 
upon it, yes, but mostly of its own internal weaknesses. 
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As the decade drew to a close, people with literary flare and political drive 
were penning tracts such as French theorist Andre Gorz's Farewell to the 
Working Class and British historian Eric Hobsbawm's The Forward March of 
LaborHalted?'An entire generation of postmodern thought blossomed on the 
gnarled vines of disappointment in the failures and rigidities of the post-1968 
working class. But if there is hope to be found in the bleak history of the 
1970s, it is in the idea that the very storm that left Dewey Burton's "hopes out 
in the rain" may have also cleared the air for the return of a broader, more vig-
orous and inclusive incarnation of the working-class ideal.32 
Burton, as usual, had a simpler take. Speculating from his Florida home 
where he retired—getting out not long before the final closure of the Wixom 
plant—he explained, "As far as working people go, it's gone and it's not gonna 
happen again."33 
